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Discovery in Labor Arbitration
Laura J. Cooper*
The mere statement of the topic, discovery in labor arbitra-
tion, suggests a paradox. Is not the essence of the arbitration
process an effort to avoid the procedural complexities that
make litigation comparatively slow and costly? More than forty
years ago, Learned Hand admonished a litigant distressed with
the procedural failings of an arbitration proceeding:
Arbitration may or may not be a desirable substitute for trials in
courts; as to that the parties must decide in each instance. But when
they have adopted it, they must be content with its informalities; they
may not hedge it about with those procedural limitations which it is
precisely its purpose to avoid. They must content themselves with
looser approximations to the enforcement of their rights than those
that the law accords them, when they resort to its machinery.1
Today there is uncertainty about the appropriateness of
discovery in labor arbitration 2 and confusion about the author-
* Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, 1987-1988, University of Minnesota
Law School. The author has served as an arbitrator in disputes regarding
grievances arising under collective bargaining agreements. The author is
grateful for the assistance of her colleagues Steve Befort and Roger Park who
commented on earlier drafts of the Article.
1. American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144
F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944). More recently, an extensive review of discovery
law omitted discussion of discovery in arbitration: "Discovery is expensive and
time-consuming, and is thus inconsistent with the desires of parties who refer
their disputes to arbitrators rather than to formal judicial tribunals." Develop-
ments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 943 (1961).
2. Some arbitrators have held that their power to rule on procedural
questions permits them to order disclosure of information, Pennsalt Chem.
Corp., 1960 Summary Lab. Arb. Awards (Am. Arb. A.) No. 16-15 (Aug. 10,
1959) (Kahn, Arb.), cited in 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN
LABOR ARBITRATION 138 (2d ed. 1983), while others have disagreed, Ralston
Purina Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 983, 984 (1984) (Ellmann, Arb.) ("I do not
think . . .that I have a roving commission as an arbitrator to do the work
which Congress has committed to the NLRB."). While some arbitrators have
sanctioned employers for failing to provide prehearing disclosure, Wells Alu-
minum Corp., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 983, 987 (1986) (Wies, Arb.) (evidence ex-
cluded because deliberately withheld), courts have sometimes refused to
enforce an arbitrator's award on the ground that imposition of a sanction for
nondisclosure exceeded the arbitrator's authority, Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v.
District 65, Div. 19, UAW, 689 F.2d 629, 630-33 (6th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator re-
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ity of the arbitrator and the courts to order arbitral discovery.3
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the only institu-
tion that the United States Supreme Court has clearly recog-
nized as having the authority to monitor arbitral discovery,
moves too slowly to satisfy the needs of the arbitration process
for expeditious resolution of disputes.4 This Article seeks to
clarify the law of arbitral discovery.5 It begins by addressing
whether, as a matter of policy, discovery ought to be available
in labor arbitration. Part I of the Article argues that the func-
tions discovery serves in litigation could also enhance resolu-
tion of labor disputes. Part II examines the legal and
institutional capacity of the NLRB, the courts, and the arbitra-
tor to monitor the arbitral discovery process and argues that
the arbitrator's role should be preeminent. Part III suggests an
appropriate coordination of responsibilities between the three
institutions, and Part IV recommends procedures for handling
disputes over information disclosure that arise in labor
arbitration.
duced employee's discharge to reinstatement without back pay because em-
ployer failed to disclose witness's name before hearing).
3. See infra notes 85-229 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
has observed that in arbitration the "rights and procedures common to civil
trials, such as discovery... are often severely limited or unavailable." Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974).
4. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
5. For previous discussions of the arbitral discovery issue, see 0. FAIR-
WEATHER, supra note 2, at 137-50; R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PRO-
CESS 62-64 (1965); M. HILL, JR. & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 278-
304 (2d ed. 1987); Bedikian, Use of Subpoenas in Labor Arbitration: Statutory
Interpretations and Perspectives, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 575; Heinsz, An Arbitra-
tor's Authority to Subpoena: A Power in Need of Clarification, in ARBrTRA-
TION 1985: LAW AND PRACTICE, 38TH PRoc. ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB.
201 (W. Gershenfeld ed. 1986); Heinz, Lowry & Torzewski, The Subpoena
Power of Labor Arbitrators, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 29; Jones, The Accretion of
Federal Power in Labor Arbitration-The Example of Arbitral Discovery, 116
U. PA. L. REV. 830 (1968); Jones, Blind Man's Buff and the NOW-Problems of
Apocrypha, Inc. and Local 711-Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargain-
ing Disputes, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 571 (1968) [hereinafter Jones, Blind Man's
Bufj; Jones, The Labor Board, the Courts, and Arbitration-A Feasibility
Study of Tribunal Interaction in Grievable Refusals to Disclose, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1185 (1968) [hereinafter Jones, The Labor Board]; Comment, Pre-Hearing
Procedures in Labor Arbitration: A Proposal for Reform, 43 U. PITT. L. REV.
1109 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Pre-Hearing Procedures]; Comment, Fear
and Loathing in Labor Arbitration: How Can There Possibly Be a Full and
Fair Hearing Unless the Arbitrator Can Subpoena Evidence?, 20 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 535 (1984).
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I. ISSUES OF POLICY
Judge Hand was surely correct when he suggested that if
the purpose of arbitration is to avoid the cost and delay of the
judicial process, it is senseless to encumber arbitration with all
the formalities of a court. It is only appropriate, however, to
apply such a truism to labor arbitration if the assumption re-
garding the purpose for arbitration also applies. Because arbi-
tration exists as a creature of contract, its rationale is likely to
vary depending on the intent of the contracting parties. Even
in the commercial setting, avoidance of judicial formalities may
not be the primary reason for resort to arbitration.6 In the la-
bor setting, avoiding judicial procedures is even less likely to be
the motivating factor. As the Supreme Court commented in
dismissing the relevance of the commercial analogy to labor ar-
bitration, "In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute
for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial
strife."7
Even if part of the reason for resort to arbitration in the
labor context is a desire to avoid the courts, there is no evi-
dence that judicial resolution was rejected because of court pro-
cedures such as discovery. History, for example, suggests that
the selection of arbitration may have been motivated by labor's
"lingering distrust of courts" stemming from judicial responses
to the early days of the American labor movement.8 The
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement may prefer arbitration over ju-
dicial enforcement, not because of dislike of any particular
characteristics of the courts, but rather because they simply
prefer an arbitrator to a judge.9 The Court has suggested that
6. Commercial parties may, for example, include arbitration provisions
primarily to achieve uniformity in contract enforcement through use of arbi-
trators with special expertise. Reynolds, Discovery in Arbitration, 18 FORUM
144, 144 (1982).
7. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960). Although the Court is correct in noting that in the absence of an
arbitration provision labor disputes could be resolved by disruptive economic
weapons, the Court is oversimplifying the matter by suggesting that litigation
might not also be used to settle a contractual labor-management controversy.
8. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW
705 (10th ed. 1986); see also Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
250 (1970) ("In the early part of this century, the federal courts generally were
regarded as allies of management in its attempt to prevent the organization
and strengthening of labor unions ....").
9. Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430
U.S. 243, 253 (1977).
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labor and management would rather employ an arbitrator be-
cause they have a more direct role in selection of the decision
maker and because the arbitrator can be expected to have spe-
cial experience and expertise in labor relations.10
If discovery cannot so easily be rejected as incompatible
with the raison d'etre of labor arbitration, the question of
whether discovery is appropriate in labor arbitration needs fur-
ther exploration. 1 This analysis must first define the nature of
the labor arbitration process and the functions of discovery in
litigation to assess whether discovery would further the resolu-
tion of labor contract disputes.
Almost all contracts between unions and employers pro-
vide that unresolved disputes between the parties regarding the
interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment will be referred to arbitration.12 Unless otherwise limited
by the contract, any topic implicitly or explicitly addressed in
the agreement can be the subject of arbitration. 3 The largest
single category of arbitration cases is employee discipline, but
arbitrators address a broad range of issues such as wages and
fringe benefits, subcontracting, plant closures, and work
assignments. 14
Typically, arbitration is the final step in a multistep griev-
ance procedure. Such contractual grievance procedures com-
monly have four steps.15  Grievance procedures usually
commence when a union representative or an aggrieved em-
ployee presents the grievance to a low-level management repre-
10. Id.
11. To say that the institution of labor arbitration was not created simply
to provide inexpensive and expeditious resolution of disputes is not to say that
limiting costs and delays are not objectives in labor arbitration. See infra
notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
12. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, 2 Collective Bargaining
Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:5 (1986). The Bureau of National Affairs (BNA)
maintains a data base of 3000 current collective bargaining agreements. From
these, a sample of 400 agreements was selected to represent a cross section of
industries, unions, numbers of employees covered, and geographical areas. Id.
at 32:21. The BNA found that 997 of the contracts in the sample contained
arbitration provisions. Id. at 51:5.
13. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960) ("An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.").
14. 38 FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERv. ANN. REP. Table 8, at 38-39
(1985).
15. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, supra note 12, at 51:1.
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sentative, such as an immediate supervisor.16 Contracts often
specify a limited amount of time, usually less than a month, in
which to submit a grievance.17 Some require a prompt response
by management to the presentation of the grievance.18 At the
second and third steps of a typical grievance procedure, union
representatives of increasing rank (steward, officer, business
agent) meet with management representatives of increasing
rank (mid-level supervisor, industrial relations director, plant
manager).19 Most cases are either resolved consensually or
abandoned at one of these first steps.20 Cases remaining un-
resolved may be submitted for arbitration, usually at the in-
stance of either party.
21
Contracts generally specify the method by which an arbi-
trator will be selected to consider the grievance. Parties may
select arbitrators on an ad hoc basis, either from a list supplied
by an impartial agency or simply by agreement. Alternatively,
parties may use a permanent arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
for the duration of the contract. 22 Labor arbitrators are usually
lawyers or professors from fields such as law, management, or
industrial relations.23 The arbitrator's fee is normally borne
equally by the parties.2
The degree of formality of the hearing varies considerably
depending on the preferences of the parties and the arbitra-
tor.25 Evidence is obtained by direct and cross-examination of
16. Id. at 51:2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 51:3.
20. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967).
21. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, supra note 12, at 51:5.
22. Id. at 51:6. Forty-nine percent of the contracts that specify a method
of arbitrator selection use an impartial agency for appointment. Id. The
agency used may be the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS),
the American Arbitration Association, or a state mediation agency. Id. The
FMCS, for example, supplies the parties with a list of names of seven arbitra-
tors, and usually the parties alternately strike names from the list until one
remains. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.12(a), .13(b)(1) (1987).
23. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at 705. There are also
some full-time professional arbitrators. Id.
24. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, supra note 12, at 51:7. In
93% of provisions addressing the expense of arbitration, the fee is shared
equally by the parties. In 4% of the expense clauses, the arbitrator's fee is
paid by the losing party. Id.
25. The author has arbitrated cases in which both parties were repre-
sented by counsel, in which the record was taken by a court reporter, in which
attorneys' presentations of evidence conformed to courtroom standards, and in
which formal written briefs were submitted after the hearing. The author has
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witnesses and by the submission of documents. The arbitrator's
decision, called an award, is usually rendered in writing within
a couple of months.26 To ascertain whether discovery would
further or interfere with this arbitration process, it is necessary
to look at the functions of discovery.21 The policies underlying
litigation discovery may also support arbitral discovery.
Discovery in litigation is generally recognized as serving
three purposes. It is used to preserve relevant information that
might otherwise be unavailable at trial.28 Discovery is also
designed to narrow and clarify the issues in controversy.29 Fi-
nally, discovery permits ascertaining what testimony and other
information is available regarding the disputed issues.30 All
three functions could enhance the process of resolving disputes
over the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining
agreement.
The function of preserving relevant information could aid
in resolving labor disputes, although it is likely to be of less im-
portance in arbitration than in litigation. Labor contract dis-
putes are less likely to have the relevant information
geographically dispersed,31 and the relative expedition of the
grievance and arbitration process makes it less likely that wit-
nesses will become unavailable during the proceedings.32 Nev-
also heard cases in which a rank-and-file employee presented the union's case
and in which the "hearing" was more like a roundtable discussion.
26. 38 FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV. ANN. REP. Table 5, at 36
(1985). In fiscal 1985 the median number of days between the hearing and the
rendering of an award was 45.0. Id. In the BNA's data base, 38% of contracts
require that arbitration awards be rendered within a specified time period,
usually 30 days. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, supra note 12, at
51:7.
27. For a series of examples of types of cases in which discovery would
assist the arbitration process, see Jones, Blind Man's Buff, supra note 5, at
588-608.
28. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: CAsES AND MATERLALs 665 (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter J. COUND]; F.
JAMES & J. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 227 (3d ed. 1985). This function was
recognized even before the initial adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938. Id.
29. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); J. COUND, supra note 28,
at 666; F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 28, at 228.
30. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501; J. COUND supra note 28, at 665; F. JAMES &
J. HAZARD, supra note 28, at 227.
31. In nearly all arbitration cases, the relevant witnesses and documents
will be located in the employer's facility or that of the local union.
32. Even for those grievances whose resolution requires use of every step
of a contractual grievance procedure, the average elapsed time from filing of
the grievance to rendering of the award by an arbitrator is often a matter of
months. The average time from grievance filing to award has, however, been
1286 [Vol. 72:1281
LABOR ARBITRATION
ertheless, when unavailability of critical information is
threatened by circumstances, fact finding in arbitration would
be enhanced by the availability of a mechanism to ensure pres-
ervation of that information.
The second and third functions, narrowing the issues and
ascertaining the facts relevant to them before a hearing on the
merits, further the litigation process in at least two respects.
When each party learns more about the other's case, the
chances for settlement are increased. Even if settlement does
not occur, the subsequent trial can become more efficient.33 In
arbitration, there is a corresponding interest in prehearing set-
tlement and tribunal efficiency. Arbitration is the final step in
a process by which the parties attempt to resolve their own dis-
putes. The Supreme Court views the grievance procedure as
"part of the continuous collective bargaining process."3' The
Court also recognizes that "if all claims originally initiated as
grievances had to be processed through to arbitration, the sys-
tem would be woefully overburdened."3 5 The parties to a col-
lectively bargained arbitration agreement, probably even to a
greater extent than parties in litigation, desire inexpensive and
rising quickly. In 1980 the average case took 224.72 days. 38 FED. MEDIATION
& CONCILIATION SERV. ANN. REP. Table 5, at 36 (1985). By fiscal 1985 the aver-
age time had jumped to 377.08 days. Id.
33. Although not generally articulated as a fundamental purpose of dis-
covery in litigation, in practice, discovery also enhances the investigatory abili-
ties of the parties. A party is permitted to commence a lawsuit on the basis of
a preliminary factual inquiry. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1983). Discovery may allow a party thereafter to obtain
from its opponent information in support of its own case, the precise nature of
which was unknown at the outset of the litigation. This function of discovery
would also promote resolution of labor contract disputes. For example, sup-
pose a union suspects that an employer has shifted work covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement to a nonunion company which is, in essence, the
same employing entity (a "double-breasted operation"). See Befort, Labor Law
and the Double-Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Al-
ter Ego Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 67, 67-70.
If discovery were available in arbitration, a union could submit a grievance al-
leging breach of contract in the shift of bargaining unit work to the nonunion
company and then use discovery to obtain, through interrogatories or produc-
tion of documents, information about the nature of the nonunion employer.
See, for example, Walter N. Yoder & Sons v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 531, 535 (4th Cir.
1985), in which the court enforced such a discovery order, saying that a union
is entitled to information which will aid investigation of contract grievances
when the union has established a reasonable basis to suspect such violations
have occurred.
34. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960).
35. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967).
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efficient hearings.36
Although the benefits that discovery affords the judicial
system would also foster the resolution of labor contract griev-
ances,37 litigation discovery has not been an unmitigated bene-
fit.38 Studies of the judicial process have identified problems of
excessive discovery and resistance to reasonable discovery re-
quests.39 For several reasons, recognition of these problems in
litigation should not preclude arbitral discovery. First, some
evidence indicates discovery abuse in litigation is not as wide-
spread as popularly believed.40 Moreover, the types of cases in
which abuses most commonly arise bear little resemblance to
the world of labor arbitration. Discovery abuses are much
more likely to occur in large cases than in small cases.4 ' Be-
cause nearly all labor arbitration cases fall into the small case
category, labor arbitration cases would likely produce less dis-
covery abuse than civil litigation. Additional evidence indicates
36. See L. KANoWITz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 305-06 (1985). Professor Kanowitz does suggest, however, that
much of the cost reduction enjoyed in arbitration as compared to judicial pro-
ceedings results from the general nonuse of discovery devices in arbitration.
Id. The FMCS, the agency charged by Congress with the responsibility of pro-
moting the resolution of labor grievances through arbitration, regularly
monitors the length and cost of arbitration proceedings. 28 FED. MEDIATION &
CONCILIATION SERV. ANN. REP. Table 3, at 35; Table 5, at 36 (1985).
37. It is likely, however, that if discovery were to be freely available in
labor arbitration, its use would be far less extensive than in litigation. See in-
fra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
38. The Advisory Committee for the 1983 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure noted that use of discovery tools as tactical weapons
has resulted in "excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are dis-
proportionate to the nature of the case, the amount involved, or the issues or
values at stake." FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1983).
39. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789, 870-71;
Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 475, 478.
40. See P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 35 (District Court Study Se-
ries, 1978) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONTROLS] ("The data do suggest, however,
that discovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate the vast major-
ity of federal filings. In half the filings, there is no discovery-abusive or
otherwise."); Schroeder & Frank, supra note 39, at 476.
41. Professor Wayne D. Brazil, in a survey of Chicago litigators, divided
attorneys into subgroups depending on the size of their cases. One subgroup
had a median case size of $1,000,000 or more; the other subgroup had a median
case size of $25,000 or less. Attorneys in the small case subgroup were sub-
stantially less likely than their large case counterparts to report unhappiness
with the discovery system or to have experienced abuses such as overdiscovery
or harassment. Brazil, supra note 39, at 869-72.
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that the extent of discovery is positively correlated with certain
subject matters, with larger numbers of parties, and with the
presence of counterclaims and crossclaims.4 Labor cases are
not among the case subject matters that generate substantial
discovery.43 In addition, labor cases rarely involve multiple
parties, crossclaims, or counterclaims. Labor contract enforce-
ment almost invariably involves only two parties-the em-
ployer and the union. Crossclaims and counterclaims do not
occur in labor grievance arbitration.
There is yet another reason why judicial experience with
discovery abuse ought not lead to the rejection outright of dis-
covery in labor arbitration. The federal courts' response to per-
ceived abuses has not been to impose any general restrictions
upon availability of discovery mechanisms. Instead, recent
changes in the federal rules have been directed toward giving
judges more discretion to limit unreasonable discovery re-
quests; requiring attorneys to certify that their discovery re-
quests are not unreasonable and not interposed to harass or
cause unnecessary delay or expense; and granting judges the
authority to sanction attorneys who violate the certification
provision." The lesson to be drawn from the experience of the
federal courts is not that the practice of discovery is unwise, but
rather that any discovery system must permit the intervention
of a neutral decision maker to control potential abuses.
42. See JuDIciAL CoNTRoLs, supra note 40, at 40. This Federal Judicial
Center study looked at approximately 3000 cases in six United States district
courts. Id. at xi.
43. See id. Table 16, at 42. Of the 182 labor cases included in the study,
48.9% had no discovery at all, and 31.3% had one or two discovery events. Id.
Only 1% of the labor cases (2 of 182 cases) were in the high discovery category
in which more than 10 discovery events occurred. Id. The Federal Judicial
Center study, by looking at litigated labor cases, may underrepresent the ex-
tent to which discovery might be used if freely available in arbitration.
Although the study does not explain the nature of the labor cases evaluated,
many of them probably involved judicial review of arbitration or actions to
compel arbitration. In actions to enforce arbitration awards, the arbitration
process would have already developed an extensive factual record, and there
would be little need for discovery once the case reached federal court. Actions
to compel arbitration can usually be resolved by contract interpretation and
would generally not require development of a factual record through discov-
ery. See AT & T Technologies v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986); R. GORfMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 561-63 (1976).
44. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. Clv. P. 26 advisory committee's note
(1983).
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II. ISSUES OF LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE
The preceding discussion suggests discovery has a place in
labor arbitration, but any discovery process must empower a
neutral authority to control possible problems of excessive dis-
covery or unreasonable refusals to comply with discovery re-
quests. In the labor setting, there are three possible sources of
that neutral intervention: the NLRB, the courts, and the arbi-
trator. This section explores whether these institutions possess
adequate legal authority and institutional competence to super-
vise arbitral discovery.
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Of the three institutions, the NLRB has the clearest source
of legal authority to supervise discovery in labor arbitration. In
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress author-
ized the NLRB to prevent the commission of unfair labor prac-
tices.45 The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for either
a union or an employer to "refuse to bargain collectively" once
a union has been properly selected as the employees' collective
bargaining representative.46 The statute further defines the ob-
ligation to bargain collectively as requiring bargaining "in good
faith."47
The NLRB, with the approval of the Supreme Court, has
found that the duty to bargain in good faith requires an em-
ployer "to provide relevant information needed by a labor
union for the proper performance of its duties as the employ-
ees' bargaining representative. '48 Although the Supreme Court
has never ruled on the issue, the NLRB and lower courts have
also held that a union has a corresponding duty to provide in-
formation needed by an employer to fulfill its responsibilities
as a participant in the collective bargaining relationship. 49
45. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
46. Id. § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
47. Id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ("For the purposes of this section, to bar-
gain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agree-
ment reached if requested by either party .... ).
48. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979) (citations
omitted).
49. See Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications
1290 [Vol. 72:1281
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The Supreme Court has clearly held that the employer's
duty to provide information extends beyond the period of con-
tract negotiation and applies as well to labor-management rela-
tions during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.5° In
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,51 the union requested from the
employer information about machinery that had been removed
from the plant.52 The union sought the information to deter-
mine whether to file a grievance under provisions of the labor
agreement.5 3 The agreement prohibited certain subcontracting
and gave transfer rights to employees who might be laid off as
a result of removal of equipment.m The NLRB found that the
employer violated its duty to bargain in good faith when it re-
fused to provide the requested information.55 The Supreme
Court unanimously agreed, stressing that the Board should em-
ploy a discovery-type standard in determining what information
had to be produced.56 This standard was to be a more liberal
standard of relevance than would be appropriate in a trial.57
The Court did not view the Board's role in supervising arbitral
discovery as usurping the arbitrator's authority. Rather, the
Board would be assisting the arbitration process by permitting
the union to sift out the nonmeritorious claims that could over-
burden the system.58
The Supreme Court has also recognized the duty to dis-
close information at a later stage of the grievance process, when
the union has already filed a grievance and is preparing for ar-
bitration. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,5 9 the union sought in-
formation about employee aptitude tests in preparation for
arbitration of a grievance challenging the employer's failure to
promote several employees.60 When the employer declined to
provide the information, the union not only filed an unfair la-
bor practice charge against the employer, but also asked the ar-
Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979); International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 851 (Northern Air Freight), 283 N.L.R.B. No. 145, at 6-7, 125
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1094, 1094 (1987).
50. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).
51. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
52. Id. at 434.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 433-34.
55. Id. at 435.
56. Id. at 437.
57. Id. at 437 & n. 6.
58. Id. at 438.
59. 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
60. Id. at 307-08.
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bitrator to order the company to furnish the materials. 6' The
arbitrator advised the parties that he was without authority to
compel production of the information, 62 but the Board found an
unfair labor practice and ordered the employer to turn over
copies of the test and answer sheets.63 All members of the
Supreme Court assumed that the duty to furnish relevant in-
formation extended to material needed to prepare for an arbi-
tral hearing. The Court divided, however, on the issue of
whether the employer's claims that the validity of the test and
the privacy of employees would be threatened, respectively, by
direct disclosure to the union of the actual test questions and
the release of employees' scores without their permission.64
The majority of the Court held that although it was the respon-
sibility of the NLRB in the first instance to determine what
type of disclosure would satisfy the statutory duty, courts were
not to serve as a "passive conduit" in reviewing Board disclo-
sure orders.6 5 Specifically, the Court held that the Board had
abused its discretion in not giving adequate protection to the
company's interests in test secrecy and the employees' interests
in the confidentiality of test scores.66
Even before these Supreme Court rulings on information
disclosure, the NLRB began to develop a law of arbitral discov-
ery. Through adjudication of numerous cases, the NLRB has
developed a comprehensive body of standards defining the cir-
cumstances in which parties to arbitration must disclose infor-
mation to one another. For example, the Board has placed a
burden on both unions and employers to furnish all relevant
and necessary information upon request.67 Board cases have
also resolved what sort of information is to be considered pre-
sumptively relevant, the proof necessary to establish relevance
in the absence of a presumption, the timing and form of infor-
61. Id. at 308.
62. Id. In the award the arbitrator stated that he had informed the par-
ties of his belief that he lacked authority to order disclosure of the informa-
tion, but he invited them to produce case citations to the contrary. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 67a, Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (No.
77-968). The parties did not do so. Id.
63. 440 U.S. at 310.
64. See id. at 316-17, 320 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by C.J. Burger, JJ.
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist); id. at 320 (Stewart, J., concurring in part
& dissenting in part); id. at 325, 329 (White, J., dissenting, joined by JJ. Bren-
nan and Marshall).
65. Id. at 316.
66. Id. at 316-17, 320.
67. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 612-14 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
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mation disclosure, and the availablility of defenses to disclo-
sure, such as burdensomeness, employee privacy interests, and
the protection of trade secrets.68 The Board has also directed
that, when an employer raises defenses to the production of in-
formation, the parties should attempt to negotiate an accommo-
dation between themselves before asking the Board to balance
the competing interests of labor and management.69 The
Board's substantive standards for the resolution of arbitral in-
formation disputes appear to have worked well in practice to
respect the interests of both parties and to promote the smooth
functioning of their relationships.
In short, the NLRB possesses clear statutory authority to
compel discovery in arbitration and has already developed a
comprehensive body of case law governing the scope of pernis-
sible discovery. Those characteristics seem to suggest that the
NLRB is ideally suited to be the neutral decision maker avail-
able to monitor arbitral discovery. The structure and operation
of the agency, however, preclude the NLRB from effectively
undertaking that role. The NLRB's critical flaw is an inability
to resolve arbitral discovery disputes within a reasonable period
of time.
Expeditious resolution of disputes is especially needed in
the labor setting. The Supreme Court has identified the "rela-
tively rapid disposition of labor disputes" as "one of the leading
federal policies" in labor law.70 Because arbitration is the
means for defining critical contract terms which affect the en-
tire relationship between the company and the union, life
under the existing contract and negotiation of subsequent
agreements would be impossible without prompt and final reso-
lution of grievances.71 Collective bargaining agreements and
68. See French, Arbitral Discovery Guidelines for Employers, 50 UMKC
L. REV. 141 (1982); White & Meyer, Employer Obligation to Provide Informa-
tion, 35 LAB. L.J. 643 (1984).
69. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 362
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also infra note 236.
70. See United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63 (1981) (citing UAW
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966)); see also Del Costello v. In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 168-69 (1983) (applying shorter
federal statute of limitations to bar employees' duty of fair representation ac-
tion against union); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 707 (applying
shorter of two state limitations periods to union's suit for terminated em-
ployee's vacation pay).
71. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63-64. Professor Edgar A. Jones, Jr., in a
thorough review of the problem of arbitral discovery during the term of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, put it even more strongly: "Time is then crucial;
often it is everything." Jones, The Labor Board, supra note 5, at 1188-89.
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the law governing arbitration affirm this need for expedition by
providing short time periods for action at various stages of the
arbitration process. Contracts commonly limit the time in
which a union may file a grievance, the time in which an em-
ployer may respond, and the time within which an arbitrator
must issue an award.72 The Supreme Court has insisted on the
use of brief statutes of limitations when parties challenge arbi-
tration awards73 or bring actions claiming a union's breach of
the duty of fair representation in grievance handling.74
The NLRB is institutionally incapable of prompt resolution
of discovery disputes in arbitration. Under the NLRA, the
Board does not have the power to make its orders legally bind-
ing.75 The internal procedure leading to issuance of an order
requires an investigation by the agency's regional office, a hear-
ing before an administrative law judge, and a decision by the
NLRB's five-member Board.76 While a significant proportion of
unfair labor practice cases are settled before an order is is-
sued,7 7 an employer or union that desires to take advantage of
all the statute's procedural protections could avoid issuance of a
legally binding order for several years until the NLRB obtained
enforcement from a federal court of appeals.78
72. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, supra note 12, at 51:7, :81-
:83; see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
73. See Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 707. The Supreme Court in Mitchell,
451 U.S. at 63-64, in adopting a 90-day limitations period for an action against
an employer, implicitly considered the state's 90-day period for vacation of ar-
bitration awards appropriate for the labor context.
74. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72
(1983) (adopting six-month limitations period for hybrid duty-of-fair-represen-
tation actions in which both employer and union are defendants); see also
Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 64 (applying 90-day state limitations period for actions to
vacate arbitration award in action by employee against employer).
75. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). The
NLRA requires the Board to petition a federal appeals court for enforcement
of orders in unfair labor practice proceedings. Id.
76. 48 NLRB ANN. REP. 5-6 (1983).
77. Id. at 6. It is also true that most grievances settle before arbitration,
and most civil lawsuits are settled before trial. The test of an institution's effi-
ciency in handling disputes should be its promptness in resolving cases in
which one of the parties intends to make maximum use of available opportuni-
ties for delay.
78. Theoretically, the NLRB could obtain more rapid relief in an informa-
tion disclosure case by seeking temporary relief in a federal district court prior
to the decisions of the administrative law judge and the Board. Section 10(j) of
the NLRA empowers the Board to seek such relief whenever it has issued an
unfair labor practice complaint and authorizes the district courts to grant
"such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper." 29
U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982). In practice, however, the Board considers it appropriate
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Not only are delays lengthy,79 but also recent data suggests
that delays have increased substantially, particularly at the
agency level. A 1986 report of the NLRB, although not con-
fined to information disclosure matters, found extraordinary
delays in agency processing of unfair labor practice cases.8 0
This report to a House appropriations subcommittee found that
in fiscal 1985, the median elapsed time from the filing of a
charge to the Board's decision was 661 days.81 The median time
from Board decision to court of appeals decision was an addi-
tional 383 days.8 2 Assuming that the median time for process-
ing of all unfair labor practice cases is a reasonable
approximation of the processing time for information disclosure
cases,8 3 a party seeking assistance from the NLRB for arbitral
to seek § 10(j) relief in only the most egregious cases of unfair labor practices.
For example, in fiscal 1983 the Board issued complaints in 6477 unfair labor
practice cases, but it sought interim relief under § 10(j) in only 39 cases. 48
NLRB ANN. REP. Table 3A, at 168; Table 20, at 220 (1983). Under this high
standard, the Board would never seek injunctive relief in cases involving re-
fusals to disclose information. Moreover, § 10(j) proceedings have been unable
to produce prompt relief. The federal courts have been hesitant to consider
injunctive relief until the Board has already completed its fact-finding process,
including the rendering of a decision by an administrative law judge. There-
fore, even in cases in which an employer has committed numerous serious un-
fair labor practices, the "interim relief" is not likely to be available until many
months after the aggrieved party first submitted its charge to the NLRB. See,
ag., Eisenberg v. Honeycomb Plastics Corp., 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3257 (D.N.J.
Jan. 9, 1987) (eight months); Kaynard v. MMIC, Inc., 734 F.2d 950 (2d Cir.
1984) (twelve months).
79. Two studies confirm the extent of these delays. In an article review-
ing NLRB enforcement of arbitral discovery, Professor Edgar A. Jones, Jr.,
catalogued 49 NLRB decisions involving information disclosure that arose be-
tween 1941 and 1964. Jones, The Labor Board, supra note 5, at 1244-59. Within
this sample a median of 5 months elapsed before completion of the regional
investigation, 11 months before issuance of the administrative law judge's deci-
sion, 16 months before issuance of the NLRB's decision, and 29 months until
the decision of the court of appeals. Id. at 1256 (NLRB personnel who today
bear title of administrative law judges called trial examiners during period of
Jones's study). Jones found that one-half of the decisions by the NLRB were
reviewed by the courts of appeals. The elapsed time until issuance of the court
of appeals decision ranged from 17 to 50 months. Six of the cases went on to a
decision by the Supreme Court, either on the merits or denying a petition for
review, by which time a median of 44 months had elapsed. Id. at 1256, 1259.
80. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1987 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Re-
lated Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
7, at 560 (1986).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. There is no reason to believe that the NLRB makes any special effort
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discovery would have to wait more than thirty-four months
before issuance of a court order directing compliance with the
information request. And, once the information was received,
the party would still not have resolved the underlying griev-
ance which gave rise to the request for information. A collec-
tive bargaining relationship cannot tolerate uncertainty about
the meaning of terms of the agreement for such a long period.
During that time, the agreement must be applied to other cir-
cumstances and a subsequent agreement negotiated.8 4
B. THE COURTS
State or federal courts could provide the neutral decision
maker necessary to oversee discovery in labor arbitration, but
only if some source of law grants them the authority to decide
arbitral discovery disputes. Although employers and unions
have the right under the NLRA to obtain from one another in-
formation necessary to the processing of grievances, 85 the Act
provides no private cause of action that would permit the par-
ties directly to effectuate those rights through litigation. If a
right to arbitral discovery is to be directly enforceable in the
courts, therefore, it must be derived from some other source.8 6
Among the possible sources of such authority are the labor con-
tract, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or state procedural
provisions), and federal common law.
Collective bargaining agreements, which commonly outline
the procedures to be used for grievance resolution and arbitra-
tion,8 7 could explicitly grant each party the right to obtain in-
formation needed by the other in preparing grievances for
to expedite its decision making in information disclosure cases. In a recent
case, the NLRB ordered an employer to provide several categories of informa-
tion to a union, including information needed for handling grievances. The
Board issued its decision nearly six years after the union filed its complaint
with the Board. New York Post Corp., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 60, at 3,124 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1377, 1378 (1987) (complaint issued April, 1981; Board decision March
31, 1987).
84. Ninety-five percent of collective bargaining agreements have a dura-
tion of three years or fewer. Basic Patterns: Amendment and Duration, 2 Col-
lective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 36:2 (1986).
85. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
86. Even in the absence of any authority for the courts directly to compel
arbitral discovery, courts have a role in enforcing discovery initially ordered by
an arbitrator because they have the power to enforce arbitration awards. See
infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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arbitration. s8 Although such contractual provisions could cre-
ate a substantive right to information disclosure, it does not ap-
pear that courts would be in a position directly to enforce the
contractual right.
In section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
Congress granted the federal courts jurisdiction over actions for
breach of collective bargaining agreements.8 9 The Supreme
Court has held that Congress intended by this grant of jurisdic-
tion to direct the courts to fashion federal common law to gov-
ern the enforcement of labor contracts. 90 The Court has also
held that although section 301 does not preclude state courts
from hearing actions for breach of collective bargaining agree-
ments,9 ' it does require that any such cases be decided accord-
ing to the federal common law.92
Among the principles of federal common law is a rule that
courts are not to decide the merits of any contract claim which
is arguably governed by the arbitration provision of a collective
bargaining agreement.93 As the Supreme Court has said:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed
to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It
is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is
making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.
Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator.
94
88. For example, a contract between the General Telephone Company of
Florida and the Electrical Workers provides:
Any written documentation in possession of the Company which in-
fluences its decision on any matter in dispute, shall also be made
available to the Local Union. Any written documentation in posses-
sion of the Union which influences its decision on any matter in dis-
pute shall also be made available to the Company.
2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:43 (1985).
89. Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
90. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
91. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 512 (1962).
92. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
93. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 585 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68
(1960).
94. American M, g. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68. The Supreme Court has also
said, "[Tihe judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the ques-
tion whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did
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If a labor contract provides for arbitral discovery and also in-
cludes a provision for arbitration of all disputes arising from
the agreement, state and federal courts would be precluded
from considering the merits of any dispute between the parties
regarding their contractual obligation to produce information.95
Thus, the existence of an explicit contractual provision gov-
erning arbitral discovery will not permit judicial monitoring of
information disclosure disputes.
While the parties would not normally contract to vest
courts with direct authority to compel arbitral discovery, it may
be that courts already possess such authority, derived from
their generally applicable rules of civil procedure. 96 Such pro-
cedural rules are the second source of law that could provide
courts with the authority to supervise discovery. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties in litigation in fed-
eral courts to use an extensive array of discovery devices9 7 and
specify a broad scope of material that is subject to discovery.98
The Rules also grant courts authority to compel compliance
with reasonable discovery requests9 9 and to protect parties from
unreasonable requests.1 0 0 One might argue that parties to a col-
agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made." Warrior &
Guf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
95. Of course, contracting parties could ensure direct judicial enforcement
of a contractual information clause by explicitly excluding disputes under that
clause from coverage of the arbitration provisions. But parties would be un-
likely to want to do so in light of the greater delay and expense which would
result from using the courts, rather than an arbitrator, to enforce the contract.
96. This analysis will focus on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a
possible source of judicially directed discovery in arbitration, but much of the
same discussion would govern equally the question of whether state proce-
dural rules could permit state courts to direct arbitral discovery. The applica-
tion of state procedural rules to permit arbitral discovery as part of an action
to compel arbitration could be precluded either because of the language or in-
terpretation of the state procedural rule itself, or because federal labor law
would preclude application in a state court of a state rule which conflicted
with federal labor policy. See Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103.
97. "Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following meth-
ods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrog-
atories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or
other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental exami-
nations; and requests for admission." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
98. The Federal Rules permit discovery "regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Material, to be discoverable, need not be itself admis-
sible at trial "if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Rule 37 also permits the court to sanction parties
for failure to comply with its discovery orders. Id.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 26(c).
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lective bargaining agreement should be able to obtain discovery
for all aspects of labor arbitration simply by bringing an action
in federal district court to compel arbitration.1 1 Two argu-
ments, however, suggest the invalidity of this analysis. The
first is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by their own
terms, seem to preclude use of the discovery provisions in aid of
arbitration. Furthermore, even if the Federal Rules do not by
their terms preclude discovery, national labor policy favors in-
terpreting the Rules to prevent use of federal court discovery
devices in this setting.
The Federal Rules specify that its provisions govern "all
suits of a civil nature ... with the exceptions stated in Rule
81.' '102 The only section of Rule 81 arguably applicable to fed-
eral actions to compel arbitration in collective bargaining dis-
putes is Rule 81(a)(3). This Rule states that, in actions under
the United States Arbitration Act,L3 "these rules apply only to
the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in
those statutes."'-1 4
A provision of the United States Arbitration Act governing
stays of judicial action pending arbitration could be interpreted
to preclude federal courts from issuing orders regarding arbi-
tral discovery under the rules of procedure. Section 3 of the
Arbitration Act directs a court, upon being satisfied that the is-
sue involved in litigation is governed by a contractual arbitra-
tion provision, to "stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had."'0L5 This section arguably denies the
right to discovery under the Federal Rules once the court de-
termines that arbitration is appropriate. Because the Arbitra-
tion Act speaks narrowly in directing the court to "stay the
trial," however, it could also be argued that the Act does not
even address the question of the court's power over such pre-
trial matters as discovery. Most courts that have considered the
101. The federal court would have jurisdiction of the action to compel arbi-
tration. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
585 (1960).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
103. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3). This Rule also applies to actions under a spe-
cific provision of the Railway Labor Act. The language regarding the Railway
Labor Act has no bearing on the power of federal courts to control discovery
before, or concurrent with, arbitration because the specific section of the Act
to which the Rule refers deals with postarbitration litigation to enforce arbi-
tration awards. See 45 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
105. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Section 3 also requires as a prerequisite to issuance
of a stay an application of one of the parties. Id.
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exclusion of Rule 81(a)(3) have determined that the Arbitra-
tion Act prohibits parties from proceeding with discovery under
the Federal Rules after arbitration has been ordered. According
to these courts, court-directed discovery results in duplicative
proceedings, interferes with the objectives of expedition and
limiting costs, and interferes with the role of the arbitrator. 06
Some courts, which have adopted the general rule precluding
court-supervised discovery in such cases, have nevertheless per-
mitted discovery when it was limited to the issue of arbi-
trability itself'0 7 or when unusual circumstances threatened the
permanent loss of information. 0 8
The debate over the meaning of the Arbitration Act to the
issue of discovery in labor arbitration has little significance if
the Arbitration Act does not govern arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements. For many years federal courts have di-
vided on whether Congress intended to exclude labor-
management contracts from coverage under the Arbitration
Act. 0 9 According to its terms, the Act does not apply to "con-
tracts of employment of... workers engaged in foreign or in-
106. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Local 37, United Steelworkers, 400 F.2d 691,
695-96 (4th Cir. 1968); Thompson v. Zavin, 607 F. Supp. 780, 783-84 (C.D. Cal.
1984); Recognition Equip. v. NCR Corp., 532 F. Supp. 271, 275 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 568 (S.D. Miss. 1976);
Econo-Car Int'l v. Antilles Car Rentals, 61 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.V.I. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974); Local 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machin-
ists & Aerospace Workers v. Pratt & Whitney, 329 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.
Conn. 1971); International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 48 F.R.D. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolim-
plex, Warszawa, 199 F. Supp. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Commerical Solvents
Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n of State, Elec., Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees, Div. 1063, 98 F. Supp. 789, 791-92 (W.D. Pa. 1951),
rev'd on other grounds, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952); see also 7 J. MOORE, J. Lu-
CAS & K. SINCLAIR, JR., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 81.05[7] (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] (discovery generally denied if sub-
ject matter of arbitration). Contra Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (discovery allowable in manner
not delaying arbitration); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators Local
66 v. Leona Lee Corp., 434 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (allowing
federal discovery procedures).
107. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers, 48 F.R.D. at 301
(union action to compel arbitration).
108. See, e.g., Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 399 F. Supp. 516, 522
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (disputed work about to disappear behind wall coverings);
Ferro Union Corp. v. S.S. Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11, 13-14 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (evi-
dence and witnesses on foreign flag ship about to leave port).
109. For an extensive discussion of the issue and the earlier relevant case
law, see American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823
F.2d 466, 469-73 (11th Cir. 1987).
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terstate commerce."110 The dispute over the applicability of the
Arbitration Act to proceedings arising under collective bargain-
ing agreements has apparently been resolved in a recent
Supreme Court decision, United Paperworkers International
Union v. Misco, Inc.11 In a footnote the Supreme Court stated
that the Arbitration Act does not apply directly to labor arbi-
tration cases. 1 2
If collective bargaining disputes are not within the cover-
age of the Arbitration Act, the exclusion of Rule 81(a)(3) does
not apply to labor arbitration. The Federal Rules thus govern
pretrial procedure in actions to compel arbitration. The issue is
then raised of whether, in such an action, the Federal Rules
would permit discovery relating not only to the issue of arbi-
trability, but also to the merits of the underlying grievance.
Because the scope of discovery allowed under the Rules is
broad, one might argue that a court should permit a party to
discover information relevant to the substantive issue to be de-
cided by the arbitrator. The Rules permit discovery of informa-
tion "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action."113 This language is considered to encompass material
beyond just the pending issues. 1 4 Applying this standard in an
action to compel arbitration, discovery related to the merits of
the grievance would be permitted unless a court held that the
discovery request sought information not merely beyond the is-
sues raised in the litigation, but beyond the "subject matter" of
the court action.
Defining what is beyond the subject matter of the action to
compel arbitration will determine whether discovery related to
the merits of a grievance should be permitted. In making this
decision, a court must balance the broad discovery policies of
the Federal Rules against the policies in support of arbitration
generally, and of labor arbitration in particular. As noted ear-
lier, in deciding cases that posed a conflict between the federal
discovery rules and the Arbitration Act, courts generally have
110. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
111. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
112. Id. at 372 n.9. The Court did indicate, however, that the law developed
under the Arbitration Act profitably may be regarded as a model for federal
common law governing the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
Id. The concerns that motivated the courts' decisions to refrain from supervis-
ing arbitral discovery in cases under the Arbitration Act also suggest that
courts should refrain from directing discovery in collective bargaining disputes
subject to arbitration.
113. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
114. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 106, at 26.56[1].
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foreclosed court-directed discovery on the merits of the matter
to be arbitrated on the grounds that court involvement might
duplicate or interfere with the arbitrator's role or might under-
mine the policy of arbitration to provide inexpensive and expe-
ditious procedures.115 While these grounds apply as well to
labor arbitration, the policy of expedition should be given even
greater weight in the labor context. The Supreme Court has
identified the speedy resolution of labor disputes as a central
value in federal labor policy.116 Although the Rules favor
broad discovery, that policy should be discounted in this con-
text. That policy can be fulfilled by discovery conducted at the
direction of the labor arbitrator. 1 7 Thus, a court should not
construe the Federal Rules' "subject matter" language to per-
mit discovery regarding the merits of a grievance in an action
to compel arbitration.": 8
The third source of law that could provide courts with the
authority to supervise discovery is federal common law. The
preceding analysis regarding the ability of the courts to enforce
a contractual information provision or to apply its discovery
rules to the substance of an arbitrable grievance goes far to-
ward answering the question of whether federal common law
ought to provide independent authority for a state or federal
court to direct arbitral discovery. When the Supreme Court
held in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills"39 that suits to
enforce collective bargaining agreements were to be governed
by federal common law, it also provided some guidance on how
the content of that law was to be determined. The Court said
that it was to be "fashion[ed] from the policy of our national la-
bor laws,' 20 and continued:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some sub-
stantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in cer-
tain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express
115. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
118. It should be acknowledged, however, that in some cases it may be dif-
ficult to disentangle information relating to arbitrability from information re-
lated to the underlying merits of the grievance. See AT & T Technologies v.
Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1986) (holding issue of arbi-
trability was for court to decide even though court of appeals had held that
resolving arbitrability issue would entangle court in interpreting substantive
provisions of contract). But see id. at 652-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that issue before Court was more narrow and did not require consider-
ation of substantive provisions of contract).
119. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
120. Id. at 456.
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statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but
will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashion-
ing a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial in-
ventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.12
1
If courts are to look to the NLRA122 as one source of the
federal common law, and if there is a right to arbitral discovery
under the NLRA,'2 it might be argued that courts should pro-
vide and supervise arbitral discovery. But simply because the
NLRA creates a substantive right to discovery does not mean
that it is consistent with federal labor policy to vest the en-
forcement of that right in the judicial branch. The Supreme
Court demonstrated some sensitivity toward that general ques-
tion in Lincoln Mills by noting that both the substantive rights
and the fashioning of remedies must be consistent with labor
policy.1-2 4 Provision of a judicial remedy for violation of NLRA
requirements for arbitral discovery would be inconsistent with
federal labor policy in two respects. It would interfere not only
with the role of the arbitrator and the arbitration process, but
also with the enforcement responsibilities of the NLRB itself.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned courts that Con-
gress vested initial enforcement of the NLRA not in the courts,
but in the NLRB.'2 Moreover, it would be inconsistent with
the federal policy of expeditious resolution of labor disputes to
place responsibility for enforcement of obligations to disclose
information in the judicial system which, like the NLRB, is un-
able promptly to resolve information disputes.1 6
In summary, the courts have no legal authority derived
from contract, procedural rules, or federal common law, to pro-
vide direct supervision for arbitral discovery. In addition, the
courts have the same institutional incapacity as the NLRB to
supply expeditious resolution of discovery disputes.
121. Id. at 457.
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The Act is part of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
123. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
125. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 187 (1958); American Fed'n of Labor v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940).
126. A study of more than 500 cases handled by 54 judges in six federal ju-
dicial districts found that in cases handled by judges who exercised strong con-
trol, discovery averaged 176 days for cases in which discovery was completed
and 253 days for cases in which the entire case had been completed. For
judges using limited or no controls over discovery, the average time for discov-
ery was 334 days in cases with discovery concluded and 505 days for completed
cases. JUDIcIAL CONTROLS, supra note 40, at 52-54.
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C. THE ARBITRATOR
The arbitrator is the final candidate for performing the
necessary role of monitoring the discovery process in labor arbi-
tration. To undertake this assignment, the arbitrator must pos-
sess both the legal authority to issue discovery orders and the
structural capacity to render prompt decisions.
Of the two necessary capacities, the arbitrator's ability ex-
peditiously to resolve discovery disputes is most easily demon-
strated. Unlike the NLRB and the courts, the arbitrator has
the institutional capacity to issue discovery orders with the
promptness necessary to avoid delay of the arbitration process
and interference with the parties' ongoing relationship. The
most recent report on the issuance of arbitrators' awards found
that the average elapsed time between an arbitration hearing
and an award was forty-five days.127 Because the forty-five day
period was needed for the rendering of written decisions after
complete hearings on the merits, arbitrators would be able to
issue awards in discovery disputes even more expeditiously.
The quantity of evidence and argument to be considered would
be much less, and extensive written awards would not be neces-
sary. In discovery cases, arbitrators should be able to make im-
mediate oral decisions at the time of the hearing, documented
later by a brief written order.128
The arbitration forum can provide expeditious resolution
of discovery disputes not only because of the speed of its initial
proceeding, but also because of the unusual finality of its deci-
sion making. Courts are precluded from reviewing the merits
127. 38 FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERv. ANN. REP. Table 5, at 36
(1985).
128. The 45-day period for issuance of an award does not represent the en-
tire time necessary for resolution of grievances. Time is also expended in se-
lecting an arbitrator and scheduling a hearing. The FMCS reported that in
fiscal year 1985, the parties took an average of 96.77 days to select an arbitrator
and that 120.56 days elapsed between appointment of the arbitrator and the
date of the hearing. Id. No additional time would be lost for arbitrator selec-
tion if the parties are using an arbitrator to resolve discovery disputes. The
same arbitrator selected to consider the merits could decide the discovery
question. The elapsed time between appointment and hearing date could be
shortened in discovery disputes. Because less time would be needed for a
hearing on the discovery issue than on the merits of a grievance, time for such
hearings should be more easily found in the schedules of arbitrators and advo-
cates. Discovery hearings, which would probably take less than an hour, could
even be handled by telephone conference call when expedition is especially
important.
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of an arbitration award.129 An arbitrator's determinations of
the facts, interpretations of the contract, and remedial conclu-
sions are entirely insulated from judicial attack. Decisions of
the NLRB and of the trial courts do not have such finality. De-
cisions of the NLRB with respect to matters of fact can be over-
turned if they are not "supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole."130 The NLRB's legal conclu-
sions can be rejected by courts if they are inconsistent with the
language or tenor of the NLRA.131 Even with respect to reme-
dial determinations of the Board, the Supreme Court has em-
phasized that a court should not serve as a "passive conduit" in
enforcing the Board's orders.132 In following these standards of
review, the courts of appeals have declined to enforce a sub-
stantial proportion of NLRB orders. L33 Factual findings of trial
courts commonly may be overturned if the appellate court finds
that they are "clearly erroneous."''1 Determinations of law by
trial courts are subject to plenary appellate review.135 There-
fore, decisions of an arbitrator with respect to discovery issues
are final much earlier in time than would be comparable deter-
minations of either the NLRB or the courts. This finality, cou-
pled with the speed with which arbitrators render their
decisions, makes the arbitrator alone capable of resolving infor-
mation disputes sufficiently fast to prevent interference with
the collective bargaining relationship.
The arbitrator's legal authority to supervise the discovery
process is, however, less clear. The possible sources of legal au-
thority are the collective bargaining agreement, state arbitra-
tion laws, the United States Arbitration Act, and federal
common law.
If the parties included in their agreement a provision
granting one another access to information relevant to potential
or pending grievances and also provided for the arbitration of
any disputes involving the interpretation or application of their
agreement, the arbitrator would have authority to resolve any
129. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960).
130. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
131. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975).
132. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 316 (1979).
133. In fiscal 1983, 70.1% of the Board's orders were affirmed in full. 48
NLRB ANN. REP. Table 19A, at 219 (1983). Between 1979 and 1982, only 64.6%
of the Board's orders were affirmed in full. Id.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 28,
at 668.
135. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD supra note 28, at 668.
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disputes over the provision of information. 36 A collective bar-
gaining agreement could also specify directly the authority of
the arbitrator to compel discovery.137 The parties could achieve
the same result by incorporating by reference a code of arbitra-
tion procedures that provided an opportunity for exchange of
information under the direction of the arbitrator.138 Even if
the parties initially did not include a provision in their agree-
ment calling for exchange of grievance information, nothing
would bar the parties from negotiating an addendum to their
agreement to cover information disclosure so that the policing
of such a clause would be vested in the arbitrator.139 By includ-
ing specific discovery rights within a contract, however, the par-
ties risk restricting the broader discovery rights that they
might otherwise have had under some source of generally ap-
plicable law.140
State arbitration statutes are another possible source of
legal authority for the arbitrator to monitor discovery. The
most common state arbitration statutes are modeled after the
Uniform Arbitration Act.141 Although the Act has been
136. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
137. The Supreme Court stated in United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
MAisco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 371 (1987), that parties to collective bargaining
agreements are "free to set the procedural rules for arbitrators to follow if
they choose."
138. See AM. ARB. Ass'N, VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBrrRATION RULES § 28, re-
printed in Rules of American Arbitration Association, 1 Collective Bargaining
Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 17:61-:66 (1987) ("The parties may offer such evidence
as they desire and shall produce such additional evidence as the Arbitrator
may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. An
Arbitrator authorized by law to subpoena witnesses and documents may do so
independently or upon the request of any party."). In some states the provi-
sions of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which authorize arbitrators to order pro-
duction of information, see infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text, are
made applicable to collective bargaining agreements only if the agreement so
provides. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
567.2(b)(2) (1987).
139. Although the NLRA does not require the parties to negotiate during
the term of a contract any matter "contained in" an agreement, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982), the parties may mutually agree to such negotiations. For the
peculiar interpretation of the phrase "contained in," see Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1214, 1217-20 (1951).
140. With respect to waiver by contract of discovery rights derived from ar-
bitration statutes and procedural rules, see 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 2, at
140. With respect to rights derived from the NLRA, the NLRB has held that
rights to information may be waived by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, but only if the language of waiver is clear and unmistakable.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1985).
141. UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1955).
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adopted in thirty-one states,14 several of the states explicitly
exclude collective bargaining agreements from its coverage or
make its provisions applicable to collective bargaining agree-
ments only if the contract so provides.
14 3
The Uniform Act gives arbitrators the authority to issue
subpoenas "for the attendance of witnesses and for the produc-
tion of books, records, documents and other evidence." 144 It
also allows arbitrators to permit a deposition to be taken, for
use as evidence, of a witness who "cannot be subpoenaed or is
unable to attend the hearing."' 45 Some state variations from
the Uniform Act give arbitrators either more146 or less 147 au-
thority to direct exchanges of information between the parties.
The provisions of the Uniform Act fail to give arbitrators
any genuine discovery authority, even in those states where it
has been adopted and where it is applicable to collective bar-
gaining agreements. The power of the arbitrator under the
Uniform Act is directed solely at the production of evidence at
the hearing. It does not include authority to require any pre-
hearing discovery. Depositions, for example, are only allowed
to be taken "for use as evidence."'14 8 Subpoenas, as well, are
only authorized for evidentiary purposes.149 In addition, the
Uniform Act grants no authority to the arbitrator to employ
such discovery devices as interrogatories, inspection of prem-
ises, or requests for admission.
A sampling of the laws of states whose arbitration acts are
not modeled after the Uniform Arbitration Act reveals an in-
consistent patchwork of provisions regarding the discovery au-
142. 7 U.L.A. 1 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
143. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 1 & annot., 7 U.L.A. 6-8 (1985 & Supp.
1987); see also supra note 138.
144. 7 U.L.A. 114 (1955). Section 7(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act pro-
vides in relevant part, "The arbitrators may issue (cause to be issued) subpoe-
nas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of books, records,
documents and other evidence." Id.
145. Id. § 114(b). "On application of a party and for use as evidence, the
arbitrators may permit a deposition to be taken, in the manner and upon the
terms designated by the arbitrators, of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or
is unable to attend the hearing." Id.
146. In the District of Columbia, arbitrators are explicitly authorized to
permit exchange of written interrogatories and prehearing documents. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-4307(b) (1981).
147. In Indiana an arbitrator may not order parties to a labor-management
agreement to provide financial records or information pertaining to a party's
financial condition. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-8(a) (Burns 1986).
148. UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT § 7(b), 7 U.L.A. 114 (1955).
149. Id.
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thority of arbitrators in cases arising under collective
bargaining agreements. Some states explicitly exclude labor ar-
bitration from the coverage of their arbitration acts.150 Other
state acts clearly cover labor arbitration but make no provision
for any information disclosure to be conducted under the direc-
tion of the arbitrator.151 Elsewhere, parties to labor arbitration
have some limited access to prehearing information but no gen-
eral right to discovery.15 2
This review of state arbitration laws, both those derived
from the Uniform Arbitration Act and those enacted indepen-
dently, shows that in most states labor arbitrators have abso-
lutely no authority to order prehearing discovery. In only a
few jurisdictions do arbitrators have even limited power to reg-
ulate any exchange of information. No state grants arbitrators
in labor cases the power to offer the full variety of potential
discovery devices.
Beyond the substantive inadequacy of state statutory provi-
sions for arbitral discovery, resort to state law presents an even
more fundamental problem. Because federal common law con-
trols enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, state law
can never by its own force govern arbitral discovery. In
describing the relationship between state law and federal com-
mon law in Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court said:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law.
But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be re-
sorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal
law and will not be an independent source of private rights.
1 5 3
The question then is whether the variety of state arbitration
laws-some granting limited discovery, some restricting discov-
ery, and some not even addressing the question-should be ab-
sorbed as federal law or whether such absorption is
incompatible with the purposes of section 301.
The incorporation of state arbitration laws to control dis-
150. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4216 (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.5001(3) (1968).
151. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150C (Law. Co-op. 1976); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 7505 (McKinney 1980).
152. Under a California arbitration law of general applicability covering la-
bor cases, parties have the right to demand the names of witnesses expected to
testify and the identity of documents to be introduced 15 days before the hear-
ing. The documents must be made available to the other side for inspection
and copying before the hearing. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.2.(a)(2)(A)
(West 1982).
153. 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (citations omitted).
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covery in labor arbitration is inconsistent with federal law
under section 301 in two important respects. The extraordinary
diversity of state statutory provisions means that absorption
would preclude any national uniformity. In addition, absorp-
tion of state laws that fail to provide any right to discovery, or
which limit that right, would directly conflict with the arbitral
disclosure policies of federal labor law.
The Supreme Court has said that one of Congress's funda-
mental purposes in enacting section 301 was to ensure the ap-
plication of uniform law.1 54 But if uniformity in all matters
was mandated by federal law, there would be no occasion at all
for incorporation of state law. The Supreme Court has not
gone that far. To determine whether federal law mandates uni-
formity here, the articulated test is whether the application of
diverse state laws to arbitral discovery issues would "threaten
the smooth functioning" of the "private settlement of disputes"
or "frustrate in any important way" any critical labor policy ob-
jective.155 For example, in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,15 6
the Supreme Court rejected the need for nationally uniform
statutes of limitations for breach of collective bargaining agree-
ments.157 Uniformity was not necessary because limitations pe-
riods did not affect grievance resolution.158 Their impact arose
only after such processes were completed. 5 9 The same obser-
vation clearly cannot be made of arbitral discovery. The ques-
tion of what information is available during the grievance
resolution process directly affects what grievances are brought,
which grievances are resolved before arbitration, what evidence
154. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103
(1962) ("More important, the subject matter of § 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that
calls for uniform law."' (quoting Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)).
155. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966). The Court
said in Hoosier Cardinal, "The need for uniformity... is greatest where its
absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes
that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote-the formation of the col-
lective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it." Id.
156. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
157. Id. at 704-05.
158. Id. at 702.
159. Id. The Court concluded, in addressing the limitation issue, "Lack of
uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any important way
the achievement of any significant goal of labor policy." Id. But see Del
Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), in which the
Supreme Court held that a desire for uniformity, among other considerations,
warranted adoption of a uniform federal limitations period for hybrid actions
that claimed both breach of a collective bargaining agreement and violation of
a union's duty of fair representation.
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may be available for presentation at an arbitration hearing, and
ultimately how arbitration cases are resolved on the merits. If
state laws that precluded or limited arbitral discovery were ab-
sorbed, the smooth functioning of the private settlement pro-
cess would be threatened. The need for national uniformity is
therefore demonstrated under the first prong of the the
Supreme Court's standard. i60
The second test of the necessity of uniformity is whether
diversity would frustrate in any important way the achieve-
ment of any significant goal of labor policy. This test suggests
disparate results can be tolerated if the differences are insignif-
icant or the issues trivial, but that when an important federal
policy is at stake, Congress would not have intended to leave
the effectuation of that policy to the discretion of state courts
and legislatures. In the case of arbitral discovery, the dispari-
ties between state laws are substantial and reflect the full
range of possible responses to the issue of arbitral information
disclosure. Thus, this second test for uniformity merges with
the broader standard that state law must be compatible with
federal labor policy to be absorbed as federal law.
State denial or limitation of arbitral discovery is inconsis-
tent with two policies of federal labor law under section 301.
The Supreme Court has affirmed that the NLRA requires that
parties to a collective bargaining agreement are obligated to
provide to one another information relevant and necessary to
their responsibilities as collective bargaining partners.' 6 ' This
obligation includes information needed for the investigation of
possible grievances 62 and the presentation of grievances in ar-
bitration. 63 Reliance upon state statutes that preclude or re-
strict access to such information in the arbitration process
160. While not controlling in the labor law context, a recent decision of the
Supreme Court is suggestive of the result the Court might reach if faced with
the question of whether arbitral discovery rights need uniformity. In Perry v.
Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987), the Court held that the federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), preempted state law that sought to protect the
right of employees to pursue wage claims in litigation. Id. at 2526. Perry indi-
cates a judicial insistence upon nationally uniform law even when the underly-
ing right is created by state law (rather than federal law in the collective
bargaining context); when the right is substantive (rather than the arguably
procedural issue involved in arbitral discovery); and even when the standard
for rejecting state law is derived from federal preemption law (rather than the
less strict "compatibility" standard under § 301).
161. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967). For a further
discussion of Acme, see supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
162. 385 U.S. at 435-36.
163. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 316 (1979).
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directly conflicts with federal policy. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has recognized expedition in the resolution of
labor disputes as a leading federal policy under section 301.164
If the parties are unable because of state law to call upon the
assistance of the arbitrator in obtaining the information to
which they are entitled under the NLRA, the federal policy in
favor of speedy disposition necessarily will be frustrated.
165
A third possible source of authority for labor arbitrators to
compel production of information is the United States Arbitra-
tion Act.' 6 6 For many years, both courts and commentators had
viewed the Act as providing such authority. 67 It is now clear,
however, that the Arbitration Act cannot serve as a direct
source of authority in labor cases. As discussed earlier, the
Supreme Court held in Misco that the Act does not apply to
collective bargaining agreements.168 Even so, the Court consid-
ered the Act relevant to the issue of what standard courts
should use in deciding whether to overturn an arbitrator's
award when an arbitrator had refused to consider proferred ev-
idence.169 According to the Court, the Act's section 10 standard
for setting aside awards for refusal to consider evidence' 70
could be used as guidance in fashioning the federal common
law rule for such cases.171 The Court, applying the Arbitration
Act's standard as common law, and citing its own decision in-
terpreting that standard, 72 held that an arbitrator's refusal to
consider evidence was reversible error only when the refusal
was "in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative
misconduct."' 73
In light of Misco, it is necessary to examine the Arbitration
164. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
166. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982).
167. Great Scott Supermarkets v. Local 337, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 363 F.
Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Local Lodge 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. Pratt & Whitney, 329 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D. Conn. 1971); 0. FAIRWEATHER,
supra note 2, at 145-46; M. HILL, JR. & A. SINICROPI, supra note 5, at 286-87.
168. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 n.9
(1987); see supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
169. 108 S. Ct. at 372.
170. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982) (order to vacate award may be issued "[w]here
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct... in refusing to hear evidence per-
tinent and material to the controversy").
171. See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 372 n.9.
172. The Court cited Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968), a case in which the Court vacated an arbitra-
tion award under § 10 of the Arbitration Act. See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 372.
173. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 372.
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Act to ascertain whether the Act's treatment of discovery is an
appropriate model for inclusion in the federal common law gov-
erning enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. No
explicit language of the Act grants arbitrators authority to di-
rect prehearing discovery. The only reference in the Act to the
arbitrator's role in the disclosure of information is section 7,
which empowers arbitrators to summon witnesses or docu-
ments for evidentiary purposes.?74 Because this language
grants limited authority to arbitrators, some courts have as-
sumed that the statute precludes the parties' rights to arbitral
discovery.175 Others have concluded that arbitrators do have
the power to order prehearing discovery.176
Although Misco held that section 10 of the Arbitration Act
could provide useful guidance to courts attempting to develop a
federal common law standard for vacation of arbitration
awards, section 7 cannot similarly be borrowed for the federal
common law regarding arbitral discovery. Unlike section 10,
which provides detailed standards and a well-developed body of
case law applications,177 section 7 does not even directly address
the question of arbitral discovery. The case law developed
under it is sparse and conflicting.178 Section 10 was an appro-
priate candidate for adoption as federal common law in the la-
bor setting because its strict standard for vacation of arbitration
awards was consistent with previously articulated and equally
strict standards for vacating the awards of labor arbitrators. 79
174. Section 7 provides in relevant part:
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise,
or a majority of them, may summon in writing any person to attend
before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring
with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be
deemed material as evidence in the case.
9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
175. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980); Great Scott Super-
markets v. Local 337, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 363 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-55 (E.D.
Mich. 1973); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20
F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
176. Groenevald Co. v. M.V. Nopal Explorer (In re Koala Shipping & Trad-
ing Inc.), 587 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (arbitrator had authority to
order production of documents and taking of depositions); Recognition Equip.
v. NCR Corp., 532 F. Supp. 271, 273-75 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (court declines to di-
rect discovery to avoid conflict with arbitrator's power to control discovery
under 9 U.S.C. § 7).
177. See cases annotated under 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
178. See cases annotated under 9 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
179. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764-66 (1983); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960).
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Section 7, on the other hand, by not affirmatively affording dis-
covery powers to arbitrators, is inconsistent with the federal
common law principle of assuring parties access to information
for grievance processing and promoting expeditious resolution
of labor disputes.1 80
Federal common law is the final source that could em-
power labor arbitrators to oversee discovery. Courts are to de-
velop the federal common law to govern enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements from whatever sources may be
available so as to effectuate "the policy of our national labor
laws."18' Various policies recognized as sources of that federal
common law are consistent with recognizing a right to arbitral
discovery and vesting the authority to direct such discovery in
the hands of the arbitrator. As discussed earlier, these policies
include the right of parties to information disclosure necessary
to grievance handling 8 2 and the need for expeditious resolution
of labor disputes. 8 3
Another articulated principle of federal common law, the
rule that procedural questions in arbitration are for the arbitra-
tor to resolve, even more directly demonstrates the arbitrator's
power to control the discovery process. In John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston,84 the employer argued that the question of
whether contractual preconditions to arbitration had been met
was for the court, and not the arbitrator, to decide. The
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court observed that the resolu-
tion of procedural issues often depends upon how one answers
questions bearing on the merits of substantive issues.'85 The
Court expressed concern that leaving such procedural issues to
be resolved by a court would result in duplication of effort and
intolerable cost and delay in the resolution of disputes. 8 6 The
Court concluded, "Once it is determined... that the parties are
obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitra-
tion, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and
bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.' 8 7
The Supreme Court broadened the scope of disputes that
180. See supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
181. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957); see
supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
184. 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964).
185. Id. at 557.
186. Id. at 557-58.
187. Id. at 557.
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were to be resolved by the arbitrator in International Union of
Operating Engineers Local 150 v. Fair Builders.188 In lair
the employer argued that the question of whether arbitration
was barred by laches because of the union's dilatory pursuit of
its grievance was extrinsic to the contract and an issue for the
court to decide.18 9 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
Wiley's reference of procedural questions to the arbitrator gov-
erned even when the procedural question was neither derived
from the contract nor intertwined with the merits of the griev-
ance.190 The Court relied upon the broad arbitration clause in
the contract, under which the parties agreed to arbitrate "any
difference" between them, to make the laches issue
arbitrable.191
The Supreme Court again affirmed the breadth of its
Wiley holding in Misco.192 The collective bargaining agreement
in Misco precluded consideration of hearsay evidence in arbitra-
tion but provided no other contractual standards for the arbi-
trator's determination of evidentiary matters. The arbitrator
ruled that he should not consider evidence not relied upon by
the employer in ordering the employee's discharge, particularly
when neither the union nor the employee had been notified
that the employer would attempt to rely on the after-
discovered evidence. 93 Although the contract had no language
addressing arbitral evidentiary standards apart from the hear-
say exclusion, the Court found that the arbitrator's evidentiary
ruling was "in effect... a construction of what the contract re-
quired when deciding discharge cases."'1 94 The Court consid-
ered it entirely appropriate for the arbitrator to have relied on
the practice of other arbitrators in making this determination
and concluded that his decision making was consistent with the
holding of Wiley that procedural questions are for the arbitra-
tor to resolve. 95
The Supreme Court's holdings in Wiley, lair, and Misco
have clear implications for the capacity of the arbitrator to su-
pervise the discovery process. Even in the absence of explicit
contractual language granting an arbitrator authority to direct
188. 406 U.S. 487 (1972).
189. Id. at 490.
190. Id. at 491-92.
191. Id.
192. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
193. Id. at 371.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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arbitral discovery, arbitrators have such authority as a matter
of federal common law.
Wiley's holding that procedural questions are for the arbi-
trator to resolve should be read to encompass discovery issues.
Discovery questions are traditionally considered to be matters
of procedure. The Court's rationale for the rule also shows that
discovery should be included within its holding. The Wiley
Court reasoned that procedural questions are interrelated with
the merits of a dispute and that arbitral authority would avoid
duplication of effort and promote efficient and inexpensive pro-
cedures. Discovery issues often are intertwined with the merits
of the dispute. An arbitrator needs to understand the nature of
the underlying dispute to limit the scope of discovery. The ap-
propriate sanctions for nondisclosure may well include adverse
evidentiary assumptions against the nondisclosing party with
respect to the merits. Vesting control of discovery in the arbi-
trator, rather than the courts, avoids duplicative procedures.
The arbitrator is demonstrably better suited than either the
NLRB or the courts expeditiously and inexpensively to resolve
discovery disputes.
Flair also supports the notion of arbitral discovery by ad-
ding that even when the procedural question may be noncon-
tractual and not intertwined with the merits, it may
nevertheless be appropriate for the arbitrator to decide. Flair
is significant to arbitral discovery because explicit contractual
language regarding discovery is unusual in collective bargaining
agreements. Furthermore, although discovery issues are fre-
quently intertwined with the merits, they need not necessarily
be. Flair's relevance to the issue of arbitral discovery may,
however, be limited by its dependence upon the broad arbitra-
tion clause that existed in that case.
The recent Misco decision diminishes the significance of
Flair's dependence on broad arbitrability language to support
arbitrator authority over discovery. While the arbitration
clause in Flair covered all disputes, the parallel provision in
Misco applied only to disputes "aris[ing] from the interpretation
or application of the ... agreement.' 96 In Misco nothing in the
contract addressed exclusion of after-discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court still considered this question to be "in effect" a
matter of contract interpretation because it bore on what the
contract expected in deciding discharge cases.1 97 Reading Flair
196. Id. at 367.
197. Id. at 371; see supra text accompanying note 194.
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and Misco together, the Court would likely conclude that if the
arbitration clause includes "all disputes" between the parties, it
puts discovery issues in the hands of the arbitrator. Even if the
contract only makes disputes "aris[ing] from the interpretation
or application of the agreement" arbitrable, discovery still
should be arbitrable. Deciding what information the parties
must produce in the arbitration process can also be viewed, as
in Misco, as a construction of the substantive terms of the
contract.
Misco is also useful to analysis of the arbitrator's power
over discovery in two other respects. The specific holding that
evidentiary issues are procedural matters for the arbitrator sug-
gests a similar treatment of discovery questions. This is due to
the interrelationship between discovery and evidence. In addi-
tion, even though the Court indicated that for legal purposes
the evidentiary issue could be considered contractually based,
on a practical level the Court made clear that the arbitrator
should be free to rely on the manner in which other arbitrators
handle similar evidentiary issues.198 Arbitrators will therefore
be in a better position to effectuate the discovery powers
granted to them. They will be able to obtain assistance from
decided arbitration cases and will not be dependent upon the
contract's unyielding silence on the discovery issue.
Following the Supreme Court's directive that federal com-
mon law is to be derived from the principles of national labor
law, three such principles-the need for mutual information
disclosure in grievance processing, the demand for expeditious
resolution of labor disputes, and the insistence on procedural
questions in arbitration being left to the arbitrator--empower
labor arbitrators with the discretion to monitor discovery
within the grievance process. Two questions remain. How
much discretion does the arbitrator retain to direct arbitral dis-
covery in light of the power of the NLRB to compel informa-
tion disclosure under the NLRA and the power of the courts to
decline enforcement of arbitration awards? And, how ought ar-
bitrators exercise the discretion they retain?
III. ISSUES OF INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION
Although arbitrators have the power to supervise discovery
in labor arbitration, the vesting of such power in the arbitrator
does not deprive the other institutions of their traditional role
198. 108 S. Ct. at 371 n.8.
1316 [Vol. 72:1281
LABOR ARBITRATION
in the regulation of labor-management relations. The arbitra-
tor's discretion to resolve such matters as the procedures for, or
the permissible scope of, discovery is necessarily limited by the
courts and the NLRB. Under federal common law, courts may
refuse to enforce arbitral awards. Under the NLRA, the NLRB
may refuse to defer to arbitrators' decisions.
Both the courts and the Board, however, will give the col-
lective bargaining agreement itself preemptory authority to de-
fine the limits of the arbitrator's power in discovery. Under the
federal common law employed by the courts, the terms of the
agreement create and may limit the arbitrator's powers.199
Thus, if the parties include in their agreement specific terms
addressing the scope of information subject to discovery and
the procedures to be followed for disclosure, the courts will in-
sist that the arbitrator abide by those terms. Similarly,
although the NLRB has recognized statutory rights to arbitral
discovery,200 the Board will nevertheless permit the parties to
waive such rights by clear and unmistakable contractual
language.201
Although contractual provisions addressing discovery will
control when they exist, it is relatively unusual for an agree-
ment to include such language. It will therefore be left to the
arbitrator to develop the procedures and principles to govern
discovery. The arbitrator's discretion will, however, be limited
by the court's willingness to enforce arbitral awards and the
Board's willingness to defer to them. The issue which must be
addressed, therefore, is how the court's enforcement authority
and the Board's deferral policies will interrelate with the dis-
covery powers of the arbitrator.
On the issue of judicial control, the Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated two different standards for enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. 20 2 It is unclear if one or both would be
199. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960) ("[Ain arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice."); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("[T]he judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly
confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the
grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he
made.").
200. See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
201. Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1384-85 (1985).
202. One might argue that the Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), indicates that arbitrators are to be
given even more deference in making procedural decisions than that afforded
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applied to limit the discretion of an arbitrator in directing dis-
covery. The first principle is that courts enforce an arbitrator's
decision only if it is derived from the collective bargaining
agreement. 20 3 The second standard, first applied by the
Supreme Court in Misco, provides that when an arbitrator's de-
cision is challenged on the basis of a procedural error, the
award will not be set aside unless the arbitrator's conduct was
"in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative
misconduct." 204
The traditional standard of faithfulness to the agreement
was described by the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitra-
tor's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.20 5
The Enterprise Wheel test for legitimacy of an arbitrator's deci-
sion is obviously applicable in assessing the merits of the award,
such as whether an employee's discharge was for just cause or
whether an employer's subcontracting violated contractual re-
strictions. Its relevance to reviewing an arbitrator's procedural
rulings, such as those regarding discovery, is less clear.
Language used by the Supreme Court in Misco could be
read as suggesting that the Enterprise Wheel standard is appro-
priate for evaluating an arbitrator's procedural rulings. At is-
sue in Misco was an arbitrator's refusal to consider evidence
discovered after the employee's discharge. Although the collec-
tive bargaining agreement did not refer to the admissibility of
to them for decisions on the merits under Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
In Wiley the Court said, "'[P]rocedural' questions which grow out of the dis-
pute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator." Id. at
557. The notion that Wiley might establish a test for enforcement arguably is
also supported by the Supreme Court's reference to this language in Wiley in
its discussion of judicial review of an arbitrator's procedural ruling in Misco,
108 S. Ct. at 372. But Wiley's language that procedural questions should be
"left to the arbitrator" should not be read so broadly. Wiley addressed only
the question of whether the arbitrator, in the first instance, should decide the
procedural question. The case was not concerned with the question of what
courts should do if, in a subsequent enforcement proceeding, a party chal-
lenged an arbitrator's procedural ruling. The essence of the Court's analysis in
Wiley was to equate, rather than to differentiate, procedural questions and
those going to the merits.
203. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
204. 108 S. Ct. at 372.
205. 363 U.S. at 597.
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such evidence, the Court nevertheless described the decision of
the arbitrator as "in effect ... a construction of what the con-
tract required when deciding discharge cases: an arbitrator was
to look only at the evidence before the employer at the time of
the discharge. ' 20 6 The Court's strained effort to describe the
arbitrator's decision as an issue of contract interpretation seems
to have been based on an assumption that Enterprise Wheel
permits enforcement of a procedural ruling only if it draws its
"essence" from the agreement.
Even if Misco is read as having adopted the Enterprise
Wheel standard for procedural questions, the Court's willing-
ness to be satisfied with a legal fiction of contractual interpreta-
tion demonstrates that, in the absence of contrary contractual
language, Enterprise Wheel places no practical limits upon the
arbitrator's discretion in fashioning discovery standards and
procedures. Information disclosure, like evidence, can be
viewed as a contractual requirement derived from the substan-
tive provisions. Further, despite the apparent necessity of find-
ing that the arbitrator's decision was derived from the contract,
the arbitrator is not in fact limited to looking at contract lan-
guage as the source for procedural rules. The Supreme Court
noted in Misco that it was entirely appropriate for the arbitra-
tor to have relied on decisions of other arbitrators in determin-
ing admissibility of evidence. 20 7 The Enterprise Wheel Court
insisted on a contractual source but acknowledged that an arbi-
trator could properly look to labor law for help in determining
the intent of the agreement.208 The arbitrator is therefore free
to obtain guidance in developing principles and procedures for
discovery from the decisions of other arbitrators and from in-
formation disclosure law under the NLRA.
The second standard for review places somewhat greater
judicial control over an arbitrator's procedural rulings, but even
this control is still largely insignificant. The Court in Misco
thought it appropriate to absorb as federal common law the
language of section 10(c) of the United States Arbitration Act.
This section permits courts to vacate arbitration awards when
the "arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . .. in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy."20 9
206. 108 S. Ct. at 371.
207. Id.
208. 363 U.S. at 597-98.
209. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982); 108 S. Ct. at 372. Section 10(c) also permits va-
cation of awards for other misconduct including unreasonable refusal to post-
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The Misco opinion went further and interpreted the miscon-
duct standard to require not merely error, but error that was
either "in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative mis-
conduct." 210 Assuming the misconduct standard is to be applied
to review of procedural decision making generally, labor arbi-
trators have an extraordinary amount of discretion under fed-
eral common law to design the discovery process.
While federal common law grants arbitrators this broad
discretion, the NLRB has the authority under the NLRA not
only to preclude arbitrators from effectively considering discov-
ery matters, but also to render wholly ineffective those discov-
ery decisions that arbitrators have made. Because the refusal
to provide information that might assist one of the parties dur-
ing the grievance process is an unfair labor practice,211 the
NLRB has concurrent authority, along with the arbitrator, to
regulate arbitral discovery. The NLRA itself makes clear that
the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate an unfair labor practice
despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement pur-
portedly regulating the same conduct.212 And, if the Board re-
solves a dispute in an unfair labor practice proceeding in which
a conflicting decision has already been rendered in arbitration,
the Board's decision will prevail.213
Although the Board possesses the authority completely to
ignore arbitration, the Board in selected cases has withheld its
own decisional authority and deferred to the arbitration process
and its outcomes.214 The Board's deferral policy today includes
both prospective and retrospective deferral. In prospective
deferral, the Board declines to commence consideration of an
unfair labor practice while a grievance arbitration on the same
issue proceeds.215 In retrospective deferral, the Board declines
to consider, as an unfair labor practice, conduct that has al-
ready been the subject of an arbitration award.21 6 Although the
pone the hearing or "any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced."
210. 108 S. Ct. at 372.
211. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
212. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982) ("This power shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be estab-
lished by agreement, law, or otherwise.").
213. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
214. The Board has stated that its positive attitude toward deferral, at least
with respect to prospective deferral, dates back to 1943. United Technologies
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984).
215. Id. at 559; Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840-43 (1971).
216. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
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nature of the issues for which the Board permits prospective
deferral and the nature of the awards to which the Board al-
lows retrospective deferral have been altered from time to
time, the Board has never applied either deferral doctrine uni-
versally. For example, between 1977 and 1984, the Board de-
clined to defer prospectively in cases involving interference
with employees' rights to engage in collective or concerted ac-
tivities or concerning discrimination because of union participa-
tion. Currently the Board defers prospectively in such cases.217
Although the Board in 1984 considerably broadened the
categories of cases to which it would prospectively defer, in-
cluding those involving the most fundamental rights of employ-
ees, it retained its previous policy of refusing to defer in
matters concerning requests for information to be used in the
grievance process. For example, in General Dynamics Corp.,
218
the union requested that the employer furnish it with a copy of
a study to assist in processing grievances regarding subcontract-
ing. The NLRB dismissed the employer's suggestion that the
union's request should be deferred to arbitration.219 The Board
said that deferral was inappropriate in such a case because the
disclosure issue was merely preliminary to the substantive sub-
contracting question.220 The Board continued:
In these circumstances, we find no merit in encumbering the process
of resolving the pending subcontracting grievances with the inevitable
delays attendant to the filing, processing, and submission to arbitra-
tion of a new grievance regarding the information request. Such a
two-tiered arbitration process would not be consistent with our na-
tional policy favoring the voluntary and expeditious resolution of dis-
putes through arbitration. 221
This rationale for nondeferral in grievance information
cases is not persuasive. It would hardly "encumber" the arbi-
tration process to permit the arbitrator to evaluate whether the
requested study would assist the union in its subcontracting
grievance. If the subcontracting case proceeds to arbitration
without the study being made available, the NLRB may later
hold that the employer should have furnished it. The union
would have been forced unnecessarily to go forward without
needed information and would likely be entitled to have an ar-
bitrator reconsider the subcontracting case. The Board claims
217. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 559.
218. 268 N.L.R.B. 1432 (1984).
219. Id. at 1433.
220. Id. at 1432 n.2.
221. Id.
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that it is seeking to avoid the delays of a "two-tiered arbitration
process," yet there is no reason to believe that the arbitrator
could not have resolved the information and subcontracting is-
sues in a single proceeding. Instead, the Board forces the par-
ties into what is unquestionably a two-tiered procedure in
which the information issue is decided by the Board and the
subcontracting issue is determined by the arbitrator. Moreover,
the Board's decision is inconsistent with various aspects of na-
tional labor policy. This duplicative procedure hardly contrib-
utes to the expeditious resolution of disputes. In addition to the
multiplicity of proceedings required by the Board's nondeferral
here, the Board is demonstrably much slower than the arbitra-
tor in resolving the information dispute alone.222 In General
Dynamics itself, the Board issued its decision twenty months
after the union requested the information and submitted its un-
fair labor practice charge.223 The Board has continued to apply
its General Dynamics nondeferral policy in subpsequent cases
despite employer arguments that arbitration is more expedi-
tious than the Board's proceedings and that the arbitrator is
better suited to determining what is relevant and necessary to
processing a grievance.224
The Board should use the discretion it possesses under the
NLRA to abandon the General Dynamics nondeferral doctrine.
In the absence of Board action, federal courts should be free to
hold that it is an abuse of the Board's discretion to decline to
defer prospectively in grievable information disclosure cases.225
In the absence of the Board's reversal of General Dynam-
222. See supra notes 75-84, 127-35 and accompanying text. The Board's re-
fusal to defer prospectively on arbitral information issues further threatens to
interfere with the speedy resolution of labor disputes because information dis-
putes may well arise, not only before arbitration commences, but also while it
is in process. The informality of the arbitration process and the intensive at-
tempts to settle a grievance which frequently occur just before an arbitration
hearing commences often result in the representatives of labor and manage-
ment devoting only limited efforts to the preparation of their arbitration case.
Without substantial advance preparation, the parties may not discover until
the time of the hearing that they require additional information from the
other side.
223. 268 N.L.R.B at 1432-34.
224. United States Postal Service, 276 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1284-85 (1985) ("blind
adherence" to federal policy favoring arbitration does not serve policy of en-
hancing collective bargaining); see also Clinchfield Coal Co., 275.N.L.R.B. 1384,
1384 (1985) (declining to defer information requests to arbitration process);
United Technologies Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 504, 504 (1985) (allegations involving
refusal to supply requested grievance information not deferrable).
225. In other contexts courts of appeals have concluded that arbitrary or
irrational refusals by the NLRB to defer to arbitrator's determinations will be
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ics or the courts' rejection of it, the Board's nondeferral policy
in information disclosure cases can most easily be avoided if the
partr seeking the information pursues its rights before the arbi-
trator and not before the Board.226 The party may fear that ef-
forts to negotiate release of the information, and pursuit of the
grievance procedure should negotiations fail, might take more
time than the six months allowed under the NLRA for submis-
sion of an unfair labor practice charge.227 If so, the party could
submit the charge but request the NLRB to defer resolution of
the charge pending arbitration. 2 28
While the Board's refusal to defer prospectively in infor-
mation cases interferes with the role of the arbitrator, the
Board's retrospective deferral policy has a proper place in the
resolution of disputes about information relevant to grievance
handling. Under the retrospective deferral policy, the Board
will not consider the merits of a dispute already decided by an
arbitrator if certain conditions are met. These requirements
are that the parties agreed to be bound by the results of the ar-
bitration process, the proceedings were fair and regular, the
outcome was "not clearly repugnant to the purposes and poli-
cies of the Act," and the arbitrator considered the unfair labor
practice issue.229 The Board's retrospective deferral standards
afford the arbitrator considerable discretion but nevertheless
can serve as a safeguard in circumstances in which an arbitra-
rejected as an abuse of the Board's discretion. See, e.g., NLRB v. Aces
Mechanical Corp., 837 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1988).
226. The NLRB does not investigate unfair labor practices on its own initi-
ative but only responds to those charges submitted to it. 48 NLRB ANN. REP.
3 (1983).
227. See NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
228. Under the authority of Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 433 (1963),
the NLRB will, at the request of the charging party, defer a charge pending
arbitration even if the case is one on which the Board ordinarily would not de-
fer prospectively. GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, ADvIcE MEMO. 77-58, REGIONAL OF-
FIE HANDLING OF CoLLYER IssUES 320, 322 (Labor Relations Yearbook, 1977);
see also GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, ADVICE MEMO. 79-36 (May 14, 1979) (refining
Dubo deferral policy).
229. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). Under this test an award is not considered "clearly
repugnant" even if it is not totally consistent with Board precedent so long as
it is not "palpably wrong," that is, "not susceptible to an interpretation consis-
tent with the Act." Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. The arbitrator will be held to
have considered the issue if the contractual issue is factually parallel to the
unfair labor practice and the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts
relevant to resolution of the unfair labor practice issue. Id. Under Olin the
burden of demonstrating that an award does not meet the deferral require-
ments is on the party seeking to have the Board reject deferral. Id.
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tor has rendered a ruling regarding discovery which wholly dis-
regards the statutory policies regarding information disclosure.
Under Enterprise Wheel and Misco, courts have no power to re-
fuse to enforce an award simply because it is wrong, or even
grievously wrong. Thus, it is important that the NLRB retain
the power to undo an arbitral decision which is "clearly repug-
nant" to the information disclosure policies of the NLRA. Per-
mitting the Board to retain this limited power of reversal is not
likely to impede the expeditious final resolution of the dispute.
It is unlikely parties would frivolously pursue an unfair labor
practice charge following arbitration in light of the Board's
very high standard for granting relief.
In summary, the three institutions which play a part in the
resolution of collective bargaining disputes-the Board, the
courts, and the arbitrator-must coordinate their functions to
permit the information disclosure process to work properly.
The arbitrator should have the primary responsibility for di-
recting the discovery process. Courts should overturn an arbi-
trator's award only if it manifests an infidelty to the
arbitrator's obligations under the contract or if it is the result
of bad faith or affirmative misconduct. The NLRB should pro-
spectively defer to the arbitrator's resolution of information
disclosure issues. If called upon to review an award which has
been rendered, the Board should be free to reject a ruling that
is clearly repugnant to the disclosure policies of the NLRA.
IV. ISSUES OF DISCRETION
To suggest that the labor arbitrator has the legal authority
to direct, and broad discretion to design, the discovery process
is not to say that labor arbitration ought to be transformed into
a discovery system that resembles litigation under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.230 Over many years the practice of
labor arbitration has evolved into a system that is reasonably
inexpensive, informal, and efficient. The introduction of dis-
covery into that system ought not result in a significant modifi-
cation of those characteristics.
Affirming the arbitrator's authority to direct discovery
should not affect the vast majority of grievance arbitration
cases in which neither party would be likely to seek the arbi-
230. For a contrary view, see Comment, Pre-Hearing Procedures, supra
note 5, at app., which includes a complete proposed code of discovery for labor
arbitration modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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trator's assistance in gaining access to information. 231 Because
the parties to labor arbitration, the employer and the union,
have a long-standing relationship and a substantial body of
shared experience, much of the information known by one
party will commonly be known by the other as well. Unlike lit-
igation, the parties in an arbitration proceeding would never be
strangers to one another. The union would also have ready ac-
cess to information known by employees within the company.
Labor contracts, for example, often provide union representa-
tives access to the employer's plant to investigate grievances.
232
Moreover, the steps in the grievance procedure that precede ar-
bitration are essentially a series of required settlement confer-
ences. It is likely that each party, in an effort to get the other
side to settle the grievance, will come forward with information
supporting its position.2
33
It is therefore unlikely that arbitrators will be frequently
called upon to participate in the information disclosure process.
When called upon, however, arbitrators should be full partici-
pants in that process. They should not take the position, as sev-
eral noted arbitrators have done in the past, that signing of
subpoenas is a ministerial, nondiscretionary obligation.23 Be-
cause arbitration is better suited than the other institutions to
resolving information disputes expeditiously, arbitrators should
not defer to the NLRB or to the courts, even though the NLRB
231. One experienced arbitrator reported that in thousands of cases over
the years he had had perhaps a dozen requests for subpoenas, but that he had
always been able to talk the parties out of it without issuing a formal ruling.
William E. Simkin, Comments at Workshop of National Academy of Arbitra-
tors Meeting in Washington, D.C. (May 1982), in ARBITRATION 1982: CoNDuCT
OF THE HEARING, 35TH PROC. ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 152 (J. Stern
& B. Dennis eds. 1983) [hereinafter ARBITRATION 1982].
232. Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, supra note 12, at 51:41.
233. Of course, an employer or union engaged in prearbitration grievance
steps has no incentive to come forward with information damaging to its case.
234. Jonathan Dworkin, David Feller & Benjamin Wolf, Comments at
Workshop of National Academy of Arbitrators Meeting in Washington, D.C.
(May 1982), in ARBrrRATION 1982, supra note 231, at 150-51; Comment of
Harry H. Platt, in Bedikian, supra note 5, at 594-95. In a survey of its mem-
bership undertaken by the National Academy of Arbitrators, experienced la-
bor arbitrators were asked whether they would issue a subpoena for a witness
when they had no information regarding the substantive nature of the case.
The survey found that a majority of the arbitrators would issue the subpoena
without qualification or concern about its enforceability. NAT'L ACAD. ARB.,
THE CHRoNICLE (Apr. 1981). The study observed, "The following comment is
typical of the responses of many members of this group: 'I issue any subpoena
that is requested."' Id.
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has power to prevent unfair labor practices and courts have
power to enforce subpoenas.
When a union or employer requests the arbitrator to direct
the other party to provide information, the arbitrator's initial
response should be to insist that the parties attempt to resolve
the dispute consensually through negotiations. This response is
consistent with the view of the Supreme Court that the griev-
ance procedure is an extension of the collective bargaining pro-
cess.235 Furthermore, this response is compatible with the
holding of the NLRB that the parties should attempt to resolve
information disputes through negotiations before seeking the
Board's determination.236
If the parties' negotiations fail to reach a settlement of the
information dispute, the arbitrator should convene a brief and
informal pre-arbitration meeting to hear the arguments on both
sides. When possible, the arbitrator should issue a ruling orally
at the time of the meeting and document the decision shortly
thereafter in a brief written order.237 If circumstances make it
too expensive or inefficient to convene the meeting in person, a
telephone conference call may be satisfactory. It may some-
times be appropriate for the arbitrator to have material submit-
ted for in camera inspection to assess relevance or to excise
information protected by a legitimate defense to disclosure.
In resolving the information dispute, the arbitrator is
bound by any contractual provisions that may exist addressing
information disclosure. In the absence of such provisions, the
235. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960).
236. General Dynamics Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 1432, 1433 (1984); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 27, 32 (1982), enforced, Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Board
directs the parties to negotiate an accommodation when information is found
to be relevant but the other party has some legitimate interest in nondisclo-
sure. Id.
237. If the discovery issue that the arbitrator addressed was a novel issue,
or if the arbitrator's analysis of the issue would be helpful to other arbitrators,
arbitrators should be encouraged to submit their decisions for publication.
Published decisions would be especially useful to arbitrators deciding subse-
quent discovery issues in light of the Supreme Court's finding in Misco that
the awards of other arbitrators may be relied upon in making procedural rul-
ings. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 (1987).
See the discussion of Misco, supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. For
such awards to be accessible to arbitrators, however, they must also be prop-
erly indexed. The index to the Commerce Clearing House publication, Labor
Arbitration Awards, for example, currently contains no subject entry that
would enable an arbitrator to locate previous discovery decisions.
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arbitrator should principally rely upon the information disclo-
sure doctrines developed by the NLRB. This body of law offers
direction on the scope of discoverable material and the appro-
priate defenses to disclosure.2s8 The arbitrator could also seek
guidance from the decisions of other arbitrators on similar
questions. With respect to the scope of the duty to disclose in-
formation, the arbitrator should be careful to apply the broad
"discovery-type" standard of relevance rather than the nar-
rower test of whether information would be admissible at a
hearing.23 9
It is not expected that the parties to collective bargaining
agreements would regularly seek to use the broad range of dis-
covery devices offered under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.240 In most cases in which the arbitrator's assistance is
sought, the party likely will be seeking only production of docu-
ments or the issuance of a subpoena to permit a witness to tes-
tify at the hearing. Arbitrators should be reluctant to order
any discovery procedure, such as depositions or interrogatories,
that would be costly or that would make it necessary for the
parties to obtain counsel. In unusually important or complex
cases, however, or when loss of vital evidence is otherwise
threatened, even these procedures ought to be available.
Arbitrators should decline, in the absence of explicit con-
tractual authority, to issue the sorts of harsh sanctions for non-
compliance with discovery orders available to federal district
judges.2 1 There is no precedent in the sources of federal com-
mon law for imposition of such sanctions. Arbitrators should
be free, however, to implement traditional arbitral remedies for
nondisclosure, including that of drawing an adverse inference
from a party's failure to provide information within its
control.242
Parties may seek to quash subpoenas issued by arbitrators
238. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
239. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). For example, the
view Arbitrator Laurence Sdibel expresses, that he would have to be "con-
vinced that what they are seeking would be relevant evidence, material evi-
dence, probative evidence," is inconsistent with that standard. Laurence
Seibel, Comments at Workshop of National Academy of Arbitrators Meeting
in Washington, D.C. (May 1982), in ARBITRATION 1982, supra note 231, at 150.
240. See supra note 97.
241. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
242. See M. HILL, JR. & A. SINICROPI, supra note 5, at 278-79. Or, when in-
formation that was ordered earlier to be disclosed is presented initially at the
hearing, the arbitrator might grant a continuance to permit the opposing party
time to respond.
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or otherwise seek to overturn the arbitrator's interim discovery
orders. The courts in which such actions may be filed need to
recognize that their enforcement proceedings are governed by
federal common law, not by state arbitration acts2 3 or the
United States Arbitration Act.2" Under federal common law,
procedural questions are for the arbitrator to decide in the first
instance.245 Thus, the court may provide limited review of the
arbitrator's action but is not empowered to offer de novo con-
sideration. Any judicial review of arbitrators' discovery deci-
sions must be consistent with federal common law doctrines
that substantially narrow the court's power to overturn arbitra-
tors' procedural determinations.246 Courts must also take care
to retain these high standards for nonenforcement in order to
deter regular interlocutory resort to the courts, which could se-
riously undermine the federal policy in favor of expeditious fi-
nal resolution of labor-management controversies. On the
other hand, if a party seeks judicial enforcement of an arbitral
discovery order, a court should promptly enforce the order if it
complies with the federal common law standards for enforce-
ment of arbitration awards.
V. CONCLUSION
The favorable effects of discovery on the litigation process
are desirable in labor arbitration. To minimize potential discov-
ery abuses, however, a neutral decision maker must be avail-
able to monitor the information disclosure requests of labor
and management. The NLRB possesses the legal authority to
perform this role, but it is institutionally incapable of providing
the prompt resolution of disputes that the process requires.
The judicial system has neither the legal authority nor the in-
stitutional competence to decide arbitral discovery disputes in
the first instance. Labor arbitrators, however, are empowered
by federal common law to direct the discovery process. They
also have the institutional capacity to provide the expeditious
resolution necessary for collective bargaining relationships to
function properly. Once the authority initially to determine
discovery disputes is vested in the arbitrator, both the NLRB
and the courts should have only a limited role in reviewing
243. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
245. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964); see also
supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
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those decisions. The arbitrator's discretion to fashion the ap-
propriate procedures and standards for arbitral discovery
should be exercised in a manner consistent with federal com-
mon law and the tradition of labor arbitration as an inexpen-
sive, informal, and expeditious process.

